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Summary
The dissertation studies the impact of taxation on the assumption of liability
under uncertainty. The decision on the provision of liability is often exercised by
the choice of organizational form since liability limitations are one of the most
important factors for the choice of legal form (e.g., Buschmann (2005), Zieren
(1989)). The taxation's inﬂuence on the choice of legal form is analysed inten-
sively in the national and international research literature (e.g., Hundsdoerfer et
al. (2008)). There are a high number of contributions addressing diﬀerent ques-
tions regarding the taxation's impact, e.g., diﬀerences in tax rates, time eﬀects
and cross-border issues (e.g., Herzig/Sander (1999), Freyer (2004), König et al.
(2013)). Also questions regarding the neutrality of tax systems concerning orga-
nizational forms are discussed (e.g., Siegel, (2004), Wagner (2006)). Most of the
articles assume certain payments so that the inﬂuence of tax eﬀects due to lia-
bility limitations is not analysed. The contributions which consider uncertainty
often neglect the inﬂuence of liability limitations on the cash ﬂows. Further-
more, taxation is mostly integrated in a simpliﬁed way (e.g., Gordon/MacKie-
Mason (1994), Horvath/Woywode (2005), Becker/Fuest (2007), Ewert/Niemann
(2012)). The dissertation aims to follow up on this issue and analyses diﬀerent
aspects of taxation with the speciﬁc focus on tax eﬀects caused by uncertainty
on the assumption of liability and thus the choice of legal form.
This dissertation consists of three diﬀerent essays according to section 2 Promo-
tionsordnung (doctoral regulation) of the School of Economics and Management,
Leibniz University Hannover. The following table provides an overview of the
articles' title, co-authors and status of publication. The essays are summarized
in the following.
Title Co-authors Status of publication
Taxes, risky investments,
and the simultaneous choice
of organizational form and
ﬁnancing
Kay Blaufus Journal of Business
Economics (2014), 84:
1111 - 1141
Interest deductibility
restrictions and
organizational form
Kay Blaufus,
Marcos Kreinacke
Business Research
(2014), DOI
10.1007/s40685-014-
0016-6
Collateral and taxation  Working paper
Table 1: Overview of essays
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Taxes, risky investments, and the simultaneous
choice of organizational form and ﬁnancing
The choice of organizational form is a widespread issue in the research of business
theory. Empirical studies show that taxes as well as liability limitations are two
of the most important decision factors for the choice of organizational form.
There are a high number of contributions analyzing the eﬀect of taxation on
the choice of organizational form. Thereby, the uncertainty of payouts is mostly
ignored and thus, the relevance of liability limitations as decision criterion is
not analysed.
In this article, we concentrate on this speciﬁc issue. We analyse the eﬀect of
a diﬀerentiated tax system on the simultaneous choice of organizational form
and ﬁnancing under uncertainty in a one-period model with two future states.
At the same time diﬀerent risk attitudes as well as the consequences of liability
limitations on the after tax cash ﬂow are taken into consideration.
In order to concentrate the analysis on the tax eﬀects that additionally arise due
to liability limitations, we will assume that there are no tax rate diﬀerences that
depend upon the organizational form. Thus, in a risk-free world, investors are
indiﬀerent between the compared legal forms (corporations and partnerships)
and taxes do not have any inﬂuence on the choice of organizational form.
The results show, that even in the case of identical tax rates of corporations
and partnerships, taxes can inﬂuence the choice of organizational form under
uncertainty if we consider risky investments. The reasons for this are diﬀerences
in the tax base of corporations and partnerships due to diﬀerent liability limita-
tions. On the one hand, rational creditors require a risk premium for granting
risky debt capital to compensate their default risk. This aﬀects the amount of
interest payments and thus, the tax bases of ﬁrms with limited and unlimited
liability diﬀer. On the other hand, the separation principle has to be taken into
account for ﬁrms with limited liability. Hence, losses on the ﬁrm level cannot
immediately be oﬀset against positive income on the shareholder level. Regard-
ing ﬁrms with unlimited liability that are taxed according to the transparency
principle, losses can generally be oﬀset against shareholders' proﬁts. Even in
the case of identical tax rates, these diﬀerences in the tax base can lead to an
impact of taxes on the choice of organizational form.
Choosing a ﬁrm with limited liability can be interpreted as a form of insur-
ing the risk of the loss of equity. Risk-averse investors choose a totally debt
ﬁnanced ﬁrm with limited liability if they face fairly calculated risk premiums.
A diﬀerent tax treatment of debt ﬁnancing and equity ﬁnancing can encourage
or hamper the acquisition of this insurance. Accordingly, there is interdepen-
dence between the optimal organizational form and its optimal ﬁnancing in the
case of risk. Hence, general statements about the impact of taxation on the
choice of organizational form cannot be made without knowledge of the taxa-
tion of the ﬁnancing. For organizational form neutrality, the identity of the tax
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rates of corporations and partnerships is not suﬃcient under risk. Additionally,
the tax rate on interest has to equal the ﬁrms' tax rate.
However, we demonstrate that even if the tax rate on interest and the ﬁrms' tax
rate diﬀer, in a high number of cases the decision on the choice of organizational
form does not change due to the consideration of taxation. This is because in
most countries debt ﬁnancing is tax-preferred in comparison to equity ﬁnancing
and thus, the acquisition of the insurance is encouraged. Furthermore, the tax
disadvantage due to the restricted loss oﬀset of ﬁrms with limited liability can
be avoided by choosing the optimal form of ﬁnancing. Thus, the actual impact
of taxation on the choice of organizational form is relevant only in the rarest
cases.
Interest deductibility restrictions and
organizational form
The taxation of dividends and interest payments diﬀer in most countries. Typi-
cally, interest payments are tax-deductible in contrast to dividend payments so
that debt ﬁnancing is privileged for tax purposes. To constrain the tax ben-
eﬁt of the use of debt, the deductibility of interest payments is often limited
by interest deductibility restrictions (IDR). In many countries IDR are applied
in the same way to corporations and partnerships. There are a high number
of contributions on the impact of interest deductibility restrictions on a ﬁrm's
capital structure and investment policy. Despite the legislator's declared aim
to design tax systems that do not distort the choice of organizational form,
the impact of IDR on the choice of legal forms is almost completely neglected
in the literature and previous research has studied the impact of IDR almost
exclusively on corporations.
In this paper, we analyse the impact of IDR on the choice of organizational
form and consider the two most widely used IDR. The ﬁrst sort of IDR links
the interest deductibility to a speciﬁc leverage ratio. Interest payments for debt
that exceeds a speciﬁc leverage ratio are not tax-deductible. The second sort of
IDR, the so-called earnings-stripping rules, restricts the tax-deductible interest
payments to a speciﬁc percentage of the ﬁrm's earnings and thus to a proﬁt-
dependent amount.
To focus the analysis exclusively on the eﬀects caused by an IDR we use a
baseline model with a tax system that is neutral in the sense, that investors
are indiﬀerent between a corporation and a partnership. We use a one-period
model under uncertainty and derive the eﬀects analytically. Furthermore we use
a Monte Carlo simulation to study the eﬀects of varying leverage ratios, risk-free
interest rates and investment risk on tax diﬀerences between corporations and
partnerships due to IDR.
The results show that IDR generally distort the choice of organizational form.
V
The incorporation of leverage-based IDR as well as EBITDA-based IDR in a
neutral tax system leads to opposing eﬀects. The existence of dividend taxation
causes a tax advantage for corporations because the IDR only aﬀects the tax
base on the corporation level but not on the shareholders' level. Conversely,
the asymmetric tax treatment of interest payments and default gains leads to a
tax disadvantage for corporations. If default gains, arising from the inability of
a corporation to meet the liabilities, are taxed to a higher extent than interest
payments are tax-deductible, corporations face a disadvantage in comparison to
partnerships.
We demonstrate that only a speciﬁc form of leverage-based IDR can be neutral
to the choice of organizational form. This requires a symmetric tax treatment
of interest payments and default gains as well as a full loss oﬀset and either
legal form-dependent tax parameters or the absence of dividend taxation. This
is in contrast to actual tax law. If loss oﬀset restrictions are apparent, the
IDR always distort the choice of organizational form. Therefore, the legislator's
aim to achieve organizational form neutrality is in conﬂict with the existing tax
systems.
Collateral and taxation
The assumption of liability is an important factor when it comes to the choice
of legal form. By choosing a corporation, one's liability can be limited to the
company's assets. The extension of liability is often required in case of bank
lending, so that the provision of a shareholders' guarantee as collateral can be
useful for various reasons.
The use of collateral is widespread in practice and there are a high number of the-
oretical and empirical contributions addressing diﬀerent questions of collateral
also in the context of asymmetric information, e.g., investment policy, capital
structure policy, and incentive problems. The taxation of collateral as a factor
which could inﬂuence the provision of collateral has not yet been examined.
In this paper, I address this research gap by analysing the eﬀects of a dif-
ferentiated tax system in a one-period, two-state model under uncertainty. A
worthwhile risky real investment opportunity is given and risk-neutral investors,
as shareholders of a corporation, decide on the provision of a guarantee. The
investors' decision on the provision of collateral is analysed in a world with and
without taxation under perfect information. The comparison of the results show
that taxation can either encourage or hamper the provision of collateral. Thus,
the well-known result that the existence of collateral is redundant under perfect
information has to be clariﬁed in consideration of taxation.
On the one hand, in the proﬁt state, the provision of collateral reduces the
creditors' default risk and decreases the required risk premium as well as the
tax deductible amount of interest. This leads to a tax disadvantage for the
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investors. On the other hand, in the state of loss, collateral reduces the (tax-
able) default gain and therefore the tax base on the corporation level. This
leads to a tax beneﬁt that is distributed to the creditors and reduces, again, the
risk premium. On the shareholder level, the invoked guarantee results in subse-
quent acquisition costs which could lead to an additional tax beneﬁt in case of
bankruptcy. Additionally, the consideration of transaction costs can inﬂuence
the decision on the provided collateral but not the direction of the tax eﬀects.
Thus, dependent on the actual tax law, especially diﬀerent tax rates as well as
tax-relevant valuation principles determine the overall tax eﬀect.
The decision on the assumption of liability in terms of provided collateral can
be interpreted as kind of legal form choice. Further research could integrate
information asymmetry as well as further aspects of taxation (e.g., loss oﬀset
restrictions), sorts of risk attitudes or diﬀerent designs of (un-) limited liability
to analyse the correlation of a legislative framework and the assumption of
liability.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Dissertation untersucht den Einﬂuss der Besteuerung auf die Haftungsüber-
nahme unter Unsicherheit. Die Entscheidung über die Haftungsübernahme wird
oft durch die Rechtsformentscheidung vorgenommen, denn Haftungsbeschränkun-
gen sind einer der wichtigsten Faktoren für die Rechtsformentscheidung (z.B.
Buschmann (2005), Zieren (1989)). Der Einﬂuss der Besteuerung auf die Recht-
formentscheidung wird in der nationalen und internationalen Forschungslit-
eratur intensiv untersucht (z.B. Hundsdoerfer et al. (2008)). Es gibt eine
Vielzahl an Beiträgen, die unterschiedliche Fragestellungen in Bezug auf den
Einﬂuss der Besteuerung analysieren, z.B. Unterschiede in den Steuersätzen,
Zeiteﬀekte und grenzüberschreitende Sachverhalte (z.B. Herzig/Sander (1999),
Freyer (2004), König et al. (2013)). Ebenso werden Fragestellungen zur Neu-
tralität von Steuersystemen in Bezug auf unterschiedliche Rechtsformen disku-
tiert (z.B. Siegel (2004), Wagner (2006)). Die meisten Beiträge nehmen sichere
Zahlungströme an, so dass der Einﬂuss von Besteuerungseﬀekten, die aufgrund
von Haftungsbeschränkungen auftreten, nicht untersucht werden. Die Artikel,
die Unsicherheit berücksichtigen, vernachlässigen häuﬁg den Einﬂuss der Haf-
tungsbeschränkung auf die Zahlungsströme. Weiterhin wird die Besteuerung
meist in stark vereinfachter Form einbezogen (z.B. Gordon/MacKie-Mason (1994),
Horvath/Woywode (2005), Becker/Fuest (2007), Ewert/Niemann (2012)). Die
Dissertation soll hieran anknüpfen und untersucht verschiedene Aspekte der
Besteuerung mit speziellem Fokus auf Besteuerungseﬀekte, die durch die Un-
sicherheit der Haftungsübernahme und damit durch die Rechtsformentscheidung
auftreten.
Die Dissertation besteht aus drei eigenständigen Beiträgen gemäß  2 der Pro-
motionsordnung der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Leibniz Univer-
sität Hannover. Die nachstehende Tabelle gibt einen Überblick über die Titel
der Beiträge, die Koautoren sowie den Publikationsstand. Die Beiträge werden
im Folgenden kurz zusammengefasst.
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Titel Koautoren Publikationsstatus
Taxes, risky investments,
and the simultaneous choice
of organizational form and
ﬁnancing
Kay Blaufus Journal of Business
Economics (2014), 84:
1111 - 1141
Interest deductibility
restrictions and
organizational form
Kay Blaufus,
Marcos Kreinacke
Business Research
(2014), DOI
10.1007/s40685-014-
0016-6
Collateral and taxation  Working paper
Tabelle 1: Überblick über die Forschungsbeiträge
Taxes, risky investments, and the simultaneous
choice of organizational form and ﬁnancing
Die Rechtsformentscheidung ist in der betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung ein
weit verbreitetes Thema. Empirische Studien zeigen, dass Steuern ebenso wie
Haftungsbeschränkungen zwei der wichtigsten Einﬂussfaktoren für die Rechts-
formentscheidung sind. Es gibt eine Vielzahl an Beiträgen, die den Einﬂuss der
Besteuerung auf die Rechtsformentscheidung untersuchen. Dabei wird die Un-
sicherheit von Zahlungsströmen häuﬁg vernachlässigt und damit auch die Rele-
vanz der Haftungsbeschränkung als Entscheidungskriterium nicht analysiert.
In diesem Beitrag konzentrieren wir uns auf diesen Aspekt. Wir untersuchen den
Einﬂuss eines diﬀerenzierten Steuersystems auf die simultane Entscheidung über
die Rechtsform und die Finanzierung unter Unsicherheit in einem Ein-Perioden-
Modell mit zwei Zuständen. Gleichzeitig werden unterschiedliche Risikoeinstel-
lungen ebenso wie die Auswirkung von Haftungsbeschränkungen auf den Cash-
ﬂow nach Steuern berücksichtigt.
Um die Analyse auf die Steuereﬀekte zu konzentrieren, die zusätzlich durch
Haftungsbeschränkungen auftreten, werden wir annehmen, dass es keine rechts-
formabhängigen Steuersatzunterschiede gibt. In einer risikolosen Welt sind In-
vestoren daher indiﬀerent zwischen den verglichenen Rechtsformen (Kapitalge-
sellschaften und Personenunternehmen) und Steuern haben keinen Einﬂuss auf
die Rechtsformentscheidung.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Steuern sogar im Fall identischer Steuersätze von
Kapitalgesellschaften und Personenunternehmen die Rechtsformentscheidung un-
ter Unsicherheit beeinﬂussen können, wenn wir riskante Investitionen betra-
chten. Die Gründe hierfür sind Unterschiede in der steuerlichen Bemessungs-
grundlage bei Kapitalgesellschaften und Personenunternehmen aufgrund unter-
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schiedlicher Haftungsbeschränkungen. Auf der einen Seite fordern rationale
Gläubiger eine Risikoprämie für die Vergabe von riskantem Fremdkapital zur
Kompensation ihres Ausfallrisikos. Dies wirkt sich auf den Betrag der Zin-
szahlung aus, so dass sich die steuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlagen von Un-
ternehmen mit beschränkter und unbeschränkter Haftung unterscheiden. Auf
der anderen Seite muss das Trennungsprinzip bei Unternehmen mit beschränk-
ter Haftung beachtet werden. Somit können Verluste auf Unternehmensebene
nicht sofort mit positiven Einkünften auf Anteilseignerebene verrechnet werden.
Unternehmen mit unbeschränkter Haftung, die nach dem Transparenzprinzip
besteuert werden, können Verluste im Allgemeinen mit Gewinnen der Anteil-
seigner verrechnen. Sogar im Fall von identischen Steuersätzen können diese
Unterschiede in den steuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlagen zu einem Einﬂuss der
Besteuerung auf die Rechtsformentscheidung führen.
Die Wahl einer Rechtsform mit beschränkter Haftung kann als eine Form der
Versicherung für das Risiko des Eigenkapitalverlustes interpretiert werden.
Risikoaverse Investoren wählen ein vollständig fremdﬁnanziertes Unternehmen
mit beschränkter Haftung, wenn sie sich fair kalkulierten Risikoprämien gegen-
übersehen. Eine unterschiedliche steuerliche Behandlung von Fremdﬁnanzierung
und Eigenﬁnanzierung kann die Übernahme der Versicherung fördern oder
behindern. Dementsprechend besteht unter Risiko eine Interdependenz zwis-
chen der optimalen Rechtsform und deren optimaler Finanzierung. Daher kön-
nen allgemeine Aussagen über den Einﬂuss der Besteuerung auf die Rechtsfor-
mentscheidung ohne Kenntnis der Besteuerung der Finanzierung nicht getrof-
fen werden. Für Rechtsformneutralität ist die Identität der Steuersätze von
Kapitalgesellschaften und Personenunternehmen unter Unsicherheit nicht ausre-
ichend. Zusätzlich muss der Steuersatz auf Zinsen dem Unternehmenssteuersatz
gleichen.
Dennoch zeigen wir, dass, sogar wenn der Steuersatz auf Zinsen und der Un-
ternehmenssteuersatz sich unterscheiden, in ei ner großen Anzahl von Fällen
die Entscheidung über die Rechtformwahl sich nicht durch die Berücksichtigung
von Steuern ändert. Dies liegt daran, dass in den meisten Ländern die Fremd-
kapitalﬁnanzierung steuerlich bevorzugt wird im Vergleich zur Eigenkapitalﬁ-
nanzierung und damit der Erwerb der Versicherung gefördert wird. Weiterhin
kann der Steuernachteil aufgrund der Beschränkung der steuerlichen Verlustver-
rechnung durch die Wahl der optimalen Finanzierung vermieden werden. Somit
ist die tatsächliche Wirkung der Besteuerung auf die Rechtsformentscheidung
nur in den seltensten Fällen relevant.
Interest deductibility restrictions and
organizational form
Die Besteuerung von Dividenden und Zinszahlungen unterscheidet sich in den
meisten Ländern. Typischerweise sind Zinszahlungen im Gegensatz zu Divi-
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dendenzahlungen steuerlich abzugsfähig, so dass Fremdﬁnanzierung für steuer-
liche Zwecke bevorzugt wird. Um den Steuervorteil der Fremdkapitalnutzung
zu begrenzen wird die Abzugsfähigkeit von Zinszahlungen oft durch Zinsabzugs-
beschränkungen (IDR) begrenzt. In vielen Ländern gelten IDR in gleicher Weise
für Kapitalgesellschaften und Personenunternehmen. Es gibt eine Vielzahl von
Beiträgen zu dem Einﬂuss von Zinsabzugsbeschränkungen auf die Kapitalstruk-
tur von Unternehmen und die Investitionspolitik. Trotz des vom Gesetzgebers
erklärten Ziels, Steuersysteme zu konzipieren, die nicht die Rechtsformentschei-
dung verzerren, wird der Einﬂuss von Zinsabzugsbeschränkungen auf die Rechts-
formentscheidung beinahe vollständig in der Literatur vernachlässigt und die
vorangegangene Forschung hat den Einﬂuss von IDR ausschließlich auf Kapi-
talgesellschaften untersucht.
In diesem Beitrag analysieren wir den Einﬂuss von IDR auf die Rechtsfor-
mentscheidung und berücksichtigen die zwei am weitesten verbreiteten IDR.
Die erste Art von IDR knüpft die Zinsabzugsfähigkeit an einen bestimmten
Verschuldungsgrad. Zinszahlungen für Fremdkapital, das einen speziﬁschen Ver-
schuldungsgrad übersteigt, sind nicht abzugsfähig. Die zweite Art von IDR, die
sogenannten earnings-stripping rules beschränkt die steuerlich abzugsfähigen
Zinszahlungen auf einen speziﬁschen Prozentsatz der Unternehmensgewinne und
damit auf einen gewinnabhängigen Betrag.
Um die Untersuchung auf die Eﬀekte zu fokussieren, die durch eine IDR verur-
sacht werden, verwenden wir ein Basismodell mit einem neutralen Steuersys-
tem in dem Sinne, dass Investoren indiﬀerent zwischen einer Kapitalgesellschaft
und einer Personenunternehmung sind. Wir verwenden ein Ein-Perioden-Modell
unter Unsicherheit und leiten die Eﬀekte analytisch ab. Außerdem nutzen wir
eine Monte Carlo Simulation, um die Wirkungen von unterschiedlichen Verschul-
dungsgraden, risikolosen Zinssätzen und Investitionsrisiken auf die aufgrund der
IDR entstehenden Steuerunterschiede zwischen Kapitalgesellschaften und Per-
sonenunternehmen zu untersuchen.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass IDR im Allgemeinen die Rechtsformwahl verzer-
ren. Die Einbeziehung einer verschuldungsgradabhängigen IDR ebenso wie
einer EBITDA-basierten IDR in ein neutrales Steuersystem führt zu gegensät-
zlichen Eﬀekten. Die Existenz einer Dividendenbesteuerung verursacht einen
Steuervorteil für Kapitalgesellschaften, weil die IDR sich nur auf die steuer-
liche Bemessungsgrundlage auf Unternehmensebene auswirkt und nicht auf An-
teilseignerebene. Im Gegenzug führt die asymmetrische steuerliche Behand-
lung von Zinszahlungen und Verbindlichkeitswegfall zu einem Steuernachteil
für Kapitalgesellschaften. Wenn ein Verbindlichkeitswegfall, entstanden durch
das Unvermögen der Kapitalgesellschaft die Verbindlichkeiten zu begleichen,
in höherem Ausmaß besteuert wird als Zinszahlungen abzugsfähig sind, dann
sehen sich Kapitalgesellschaften einem Nachteil gegenüber im Vergleich zu Per-
sonenunternehmen.
Wir zeigen, dass nur eine speziﬁsche Form der verschuldungsgradabhängigen
IDR neutral sein kann in Bezug auf die Rechtsformwahl. Dies erfordert eine sym-
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metrische Besteuerung von Zinszahlungen und Verbindlichkeitswegfall ebenso
wie eine vollständige Verlustverrechnung und entweder rechtsformabhängige
Besteuerungsparameter oder die Nichtexistenz von Dividendenbesteuerung. Dies
steht im Gegensatz zum aktuellen Steuerrecht. Wenn Verlustverrechnungs-
beschränkungen existieren, verzerrt die IDR stets die Rechtsformwahl. Daher
steht das Ziel des Gesetzgebers, Rechtformneutralität zu erreichen, im Gegen-
satz zu dem bestehenden Steuersystem.
Collateral and taxation
Die Haftungsübernahme ist ein wichtiger Faktor, wenn es zu einer Rechtsfor-
mentscheidung kommt. Durch die Wahl einer Kapitalgesellschaft kann die Haf-
tung auf das Unternehmensvermögen begrenzt werden. Im Fall der Kreditver-
gabe wird von Banken oft die Ausweitung der Haftung gefordert, so dass die
Stellung einer Gesellschafterbürgschaft als Sicherheit aus verschiedenen Grün-
den sinnvoll sein kann.
Der Gebrauch von Sicherheiten ist in der Praxis weit verbreitet und es gibt
eine Vielzahl von theoretischen und empirischen Beiträgen, die unterschiedliche
Fragestellungen in Bezug auf Sicherheiten auch im Kontext asymmetrischer In-
formation untersuchen, z.B. Investitionspolitik, Kapitalstrukturpolitik und An-
reizprobleme. Die Besteuerung von Sicherheiten als ein Faktor, der die Stellung
von Sicherheiten beeinﬂussen könnte, wurde bisher nicht untersucht.
In diesem Beitrag gehe ich diese Forschungslücke an und untersuche die Wirkung
eines diﬀerenzierten Steuersystems in einem Ein-Perioden-Modell mit zwei Zustän-
den unter Unsicherheit. Gegeben ist eine lohnenswerte riskante Realinvestition
und risikoneutrale Investoren entscheiden als Gesellschafter einer Kapitalge-
sellschaft über die Stellung einer Bürgschaft. Die Entscheidung der Investoren
über die Stellung von Sicherheiten wird in einer Welt mit und ohne Berück-
sichtigung von Steuern unter perfekter Information untersucht. Der Vergleich
der Ergebnisse zeigt, dass die Besteuerung die Stellung von Sicherheiten sowohl
fördern als auch behindern kann. Daher muss das bekannte Ergebnis, dass
die Existenz von Sicherheiten bei perfekter Information redundant ist, unter
Berücksichtigung von Steuern präzisiert werden.
Auf der einen Seite vermindert die Stellung von Sicherheiten das Ausfallrisiko
der Gläubiger und verringert die geforderte Risikoprämie ebenso wie den steuer-
lich abzugsfähigen Zinsbetrag im Gewinnzustand. Dies führt zu einem Steuer-
nachteil für die Investoren. Auf der anderen Seite vermindern Sicherheiten
den (steuerpﬂichtigen) Verbindlichkeitswegfall im Verlustzustand und damit
die steuerliche Bemessungsgrundlage auf Unternehmensebene. Dies führt zu
einem Steuervorteil, der an die Gläubiger ausgezahlt wird und damit nochmals
die Risikoprämie verringert. Auf Anteilseignerebene führt die in Anspruch
genommene Bürgschaft zu nachträglichen Anschaﬀungskosten, die im Insolven-
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zfall zu einem zusätzlichen Steuervorteil führen könnte. Außerdem kann die
Berücksichtigung von Transaktionskosten zwar die Entscheidung über die Stel-
lung von Sicherheiten beeinﬂussen, jedoch nicht die Richtung der Steuereﬀekte.
Abhängig vom aktuellen Steuerrecht können daher vor allem unterschiedliche
Steuersätze ebenso wie steuerlich relevante Bewertungsprinzipien den steuer-
lichen Gesamteﬀekt bestimmen.
Die Entscheidung über die Haftungsübernahme in Form von der Stellung von
Sicherheiten kann als eine Art Rechtsformentscheidung interpretiert werden.
Weitere Forschung könnte Informationsasymmetrie sowie weitere Aspekte der
Besteuerung (z.B. Verlustverrechnungsbeschränkungen), verschiedene Risikoe-
instellungen oder andersartige Ausführungen von (un-)beschränkter Haftung
einbeziehen um den Zusammenhang zwischen den rechtlichen Rahmenbedin-
gungen und der Haftungsübernahme zu analysieren.
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Collateral and taxation
Britta Manteia
aLeibniz Universität Hannover
Abstract
Empirical studies show that the majority of loans are secured. Collateral, as
a form of liability, is widely used to reduce the lenders default risk. A lot
of diﬀerent aspects are analysed empirically and theoretically in the context
of the use of collateral. But, the integration of collateral's taxation has not
yet been studied. The purpose of this paper is the analysis of tax eﬀects on the
provision of guarantees for risky debt capital in a simple one-period model under
uncertainty. Therefore, risk-neutral investors decide about the optimality of the
securitization of granted loans in a world with and without taxation. The results
show that taxation can but not necessarily does change the investors' decision.
Thus, the well-known result that the existence of collateral is redundant under
perfect information has to be clariﬁed in consideration of taxation: tax beneﬁts
can justify the existence of collateral under perfect information.
Keywords Limited liability  Taxation  Collateral
JEL classiﬁcation G3  H25  K34  M21
1 Introduction
When it comes to the choice of a company's legal form, the assumption of
liability is very important and can be determined by choosing a legal structure
(e.g., Buschmann (2005), Zieren (1989)). In principle, one's liability can be
limited to the company's assets by choosing a corporation. The choice of an
unlimited liable company, e.g. a partnership, implies that the shareholders'
private wealth is also liable for the ﬁrm's obligations. Although changing legal
forms to another is possible, the decision for one legal form is quite restrictive
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because the change is accompagnied with various transaction costs. Another
possibility to vary the assumption of liability is the provision of securities. For
various reasons it can be rational to extend the liability by providing collateral,
for example in form of a guarantee, if a project is meant to be carried out in a
corporation.
The topic of collateral is often discussed in the literature. Moral hazard and
asymmetric information problems are seen as the two major reasons for the use
of collateral. As shown in several models, the use of collateral is redundant
under perfect information. Thus, only the consideration of information asym-
metry often justiﬁes the existence of collateral. There are a lot of theoretical
and empirical studies in the context of secured lending which mainly integrate
asymmetric information.
Information asymmetry between a lender and a borrower is often associated
with the risk of the borrower's project, e.g., Bester (1985, 1987), Chan/Kanatas
(1985), Besanko/Thakor (1987a, b). It is generally measured by diﬀering default
probabilities of the projects. Borrowers who are deﬁned as good borrowers
typically face a lower default probability than bad borrowers. All these models
assume that the provision of collateral is combined with corresponding costs that
diﬀer between good and bad borrowers (as the default probability of the good
borrowers is lower). To compensate for the default risk for the lender, collateral
and interest rate requirements often act as substitutes in loan contracts.
The provision of securities can be used as a sorting device in the context of
imperfect information. Using diﬀerent loan contracts as the self-selection mech-
anism, Bester (1985) showed that an equilibrium can be characterized by the
separation of borrowers with diﬀerent risk.1 As a result, good borrowers typi-
cally provide more collateral than bad borrowers because good borrowers gain
from being identiﬁed as less risky. However, these ﬁndings are opposed by sev-
eral empirical studies, e.g., Berger/Udell (1990), Jiménez/Saurina (2004).
Another strand of the literature considers the possibility of increasing the success
probability by increasing eﬀort, e.g., Chan/Thakor (1987), Boot et al. (1991),
Pozzolo (2002). In this context, moral hazard problems are taken into consider-
ation and collateral is used as incentive device to aﬀord more eﬀort. The more
expensive the loss of collateral is, the more worthwhile it is to increase eﬀort. In
his model, Pozzolo (2002) shows that under perfect information collateral and
interest rate requirements can function as complements and not as substitutes.
Thus, risky borrowers pledge more collateral because the creditors compensate
higher risk with securitization and higher interest rates. In their study, Boot et
al. (1991) present in this context that the additional consideration of asymmet-
ric information leads to an increase of provided collateral by good borrowers.
They also found that when the interest rate is increased, the level of collateral
1Credit rationing does not occur because it is possible to screen diﬀerent types of borrowers,
Bester (1985), p. 850. In their seminal paper, Stiglitz/Weiss (1981) show that credit rationing
can occur. Their ﬁndings basically result from adverse selection eﬀects and the problem that
an increasing interest rate could promote risikier projects.
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increases as well.
In his study, Koziol (2007) focused precisely on the question whether good
borrowers pledge more collateral than bad borrowers. He considers propor-
tional bankruptcy costs and costs for pledging collateral explicitly. Thus, the
optimal choice of collateral results from the tradeoﬀ between reduced interest
payments, lower bankruptcy costs and the costs arising from pledging collateral.
It is shown that the allocation of information is crucial for the optimal choice
of collateral. Under perfect information, good borrowers pledge less collat-
eral than bad borrowers, while under asymmetric information the relation is
reversed.
There are several other essays addressing diﬀerent questions regarding the topic
of collateral. Some examples include the correlation with the maturity of the
loans or strength of the lending relationship (e.g., Lensink/Pham (2006), Ortiz-
Molina/Penas (2008), Steijvers et al. (2010)), exogenous variation of lender in-
formation (e.g., Berger et al. (2011)), credit market competition (e.g., Jiménez
et al. (2006)) or stochastic future values of collateral and stochastic success prob-
abilities (Niinimäki (2011)). For a survey of theoretical and empirical research
on the use of collateral, see Coco (2000) and Steijvers/Voordeckers (2009).
Although there are a high number of contributions on the issue of taxation and
liability focusing the optimal choice of legal form, all of the above mentioned
articles did not integrate taxation at all.
Addressing the question of the justiﬁcation of double taxation for corporations,
Becker/Fuest (2007) modeled an investment decision of investors with limited
and unlimited liability. They do not model collateral, but vary the assump-
tion of liability through the supply of limited liability contracts and unlimited
liability contracts for bank loans. Assuming a highly simpliﬁed tax system,
they derive the investors' investment decision under perfect information and
under asymmetric information concerning the investors' type and the risk of
the project. The investors' type is determined by their risk attitude modeled
by a(n) (un-)restricted taxable loss oﬀset. Their model shows that asymmetric
information can lead to overinvestment in a world without taxation. An addi-
tional tax on limited liability contracts reduced the incentive to overinvest and
leads to an eﬃcient equilibrium. Thus, corporate taxation is seen as means of
correcting the failure of the capital market. Miglo (2007) extends the model
of Becker/Fuest (2007) by adding a modiﬁed production technology and shows
that both overinvestment and underinvestment can arise. As in Becker/Fuest's
(2007) article, he does not model collateral explicitly and neglect diﬀerentiated
tax eﬀects.
In this paper I address this research gap by analysing the eﬀects of a diﬀer-
entiated tax system under perfect information on the provision of collateral as
means to assume liability. To consider this issue, I extend a model previously
used by Blaufus/Hundsdoerfer (2008), Blaufus/Mantei (2014) and Blaufus et al.
(2014) by integrating the possibility to assume collateral and its diﬀerentiated
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taxation. Therefore, risk-neutral investors decide on their optimal amount of
provided collateral in a one-period model under uncertainty. The results show
that taxes can either encourage or hamper the provision of collateral. Thus, even
under perfect information, tax beneﬁts can justiﬁy the existence of collateral.
The optimal provision of collateral as device for the assumption of liability can
be interpreted as kind of legal form choice and is analysed from the investors'
point of view.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the following section, the
baseline model is presented with a short derivation of the investors' decision in a
world with perfect information and without taxation. In section (3), taxation is
taken into consideration, ﬁrst in a general manner, subsequently with particular
regard to German tax law. The paper concludes with the summary of the results
and a brief discussion in section (4).
2 Baseline Model - without Taxation
In the baseline model, the risk-neutral investors are situated in a one-period
model under uncertainty and aim to maximize their expected future value FV .
In t = 0 they have an initial endowment of W ≥ 0 and face a worthwhile risky
real investment opportunity that can be conducted in a corporation that is also
found in t = 0.
The investment expenditure amounting to I0 can be ﬁnanced with debt (λI0)
and with equity ((1− λ) I0 ≤W ). The endowment that is not used for the real
investment (W−(1− λ) I0) is invested risk-free on the capital market. The debt
ratio is deﬁned as 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Debt capital is oﬀered by risk-neutral creditors.
The capital market is competitive and free of arbitrage. There is no restriction
to investing and lending risk-free capital. The risk-free interest rate is denoted
by rf .
In t = 1 there are two possible future states, s high and low, with s = h, l.
State s = h (s = l) occurs with the investor speciﬁc success probability pi
(1−pi) and promises a return of the real investment amounting to CFh (CFl).2
The success probability pi can be seen as a measurement for the investors'
business risk. The success probability can be diﬀerent e.g. due to diﬀerent
eﬀort, diﬀerent personal characteristics etc. The investors have to pay back the
loan λI0 as well as the required interest payment on the debt capital iλI0. There
is no information asymmetry.
To investigate the relevance of liability limitations the default risk of the credi-
tors is modeled as follows. The return of the real investment in state high (CFh)
covers the entire liabilities of the investor, in state low the return of the invest-
2The investigation is limited to two future states without loss of generality. It is suﬃcient to
model the uncertainty with one state high and one state low where the liability limitation
becomes relevant. For further analysis of multiples state, see Blaufus et al. (2014).
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ment, CFl, does not cover the debt liabilites, the corporation goes bankrupt.
Due to the limited liability of the corporation the bank has no access to the
private wealth of the shareholders. Thus, the creditors face a default risk with
a probability 1 − pi.3 Anticipating the default risk, the creditors will charge a
risk premium (RP ) for lending risky capital.
The amount of the debt ratio of the real investment also determines the invest-
ment of the remaining capital on the capital market (W − (1− λ) I0). In this
analysis, the amount of the debt ratio (and thus the alternative investment of
the remaining initial endowment) does not inﬂuence the results of the research
question for several reasons. First, under the assumption of an unrestricted
capital market with the opportunity of risk-neutral lending and investing, the
ﬁnancing decision is irrelevant in a world without taxation for risk-neutral in-
vestors.4 Second, in a world with taxation, even under uncertainty the ﬁnancing
decision is only driven by diﬀerences between the tax rate on interest income
and on corporate income.5 These tax rates are assumed to be identical in this
model so that the general implications of the analysis are not distorted by dif-
fering debt ratios. Thus, the consideration of the capital market investment of
the remaining endowment is not necessary for the analysis of the inﬂuence of
taxation on the collateralization and neglected in the formulas.6
The investors have the opportunity to lower the corporation's liability limita-
tions and provide collateral C ≥ 0 to the creditors. In t = 0 they decide on the
amount of the collateralization (C), with the optimal amount being denoted
by C∗. The collateral can be interpreted as a guarantee given by the corpo-
ration's shareholders. Assuming that there is unrestricted access to collateral
(the shareholders own suﬃcient private wealth), the granted debt (respectively
the receivables of the creditors) can be secured completely and compensates the
creditors' investment risk. In this case, the situation equals an unlimited liable
company.7 The value of the collateral is assumed to be constant over time.
From the investors' point of view, the additional costs of providing collateral
are not modeled here. In general, the additional costs of collateral only hamper
the provision of collateral and make it more attractive to limit the liability and
take an unsecured loan. Moreover, insolvency costs, reputation costs or similar
are neglected.8 From the creditors' point of view, transaction costs, for example
arising from the liquidation of the collateral, are taken into account in form
3The default probability of every investor is given exogenously. For endogenous default
probability, see Blaufus et al. (2014).
4Increasing debt leads to an increase of the capital market investment. The interest received
with the interest rate rf equal the expected interest payments to the creditors. Thus, the
ﬁnancing decision does not inﬂuence the expected utility of the future value of risk neutral
investors (see Blaufus/Mantei (2014), p. 1118).
5See Blaufus/Mantei (2014), p. 1121.
6Several essays do not integrate an initial endowment or the possibility of equity ﬁnancing.
See e.g., Boot et al. (1991) and Koziol (2007), who excludes equity ﬁnancing and concentrates
his analysis on the maximization of the value of the debt ﬁnanced project.
7For the derivation of the maximal eﬀective collateral, see Appendix (5.1).
8See e.g., Besanko/Thakor (1987a).
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of a valuation haircut of the collateral. This assumed disparity in collateral
valuation between the investors and the creditors inﬂuences the required risk
premium and thus occurring tax eﬀects. The provided collateral is valued by
the creditors with a proportional factor 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 as αC. Hence, the value of
collateral that is recovered in the state of loss is lower for the creditors than for
the investors if α < 1.9 The payments to the creditors in t = 1 are denoted
by Ds = Dh, Dl. In state low, it is necessary to distinguish between creditors
and investors; the additional subscript cv indicates the creditors' valuation. In
state high there is no diﬀerence. It holdsDh = Dh−cv∀α andDl ≥ Dl−cv∀α ≤ 1.
Ds−cv =
{
Dh−cv = λI0 (1 + i) with pi
Dl−cv = CFl + αC with 1− pi
(1)
In state high the creditors receivables are fully paid. They receive the redemp-
tion of the granted loan λI0 as well as the required interest payment iλI0. In
state low, the return of the investment CFl (equals the wealth of the corporation
in t = 1) as well as the collateral C is payed to the creditors. The remaining
outstanding liability cannot be met. To compensate the default that occurs
with probability 1 − pi, risk-neutral creditors demand a nominal interest rate
i ≥ rf to get an expected return equal to the risk free capital market interest
rate rf . The risk premium is denoted by RP = i− rf ≥ 0.
The creditors calculus results in:
λ (1 + rf ) = E [Ds−cv] (2)
and leads to the following risk premium:10
RP =
1− pi
pi
· λ (1 + rf )− CFl − αC
λ
(3)
The investors decide about collateralization of the borrowings in order to max-
imize the expected utility of the future value of the risky investment:
E [U (FVs)] = E [U (CFs −Ds)] (4)
with FVh = CFh − λI0 (1 + i) and FVl = CFl −Dl = −C.11 Without loss of
generality, the investment expenditure is scaled to I0 = 1 in the following.
9For the use of valuation disparities, see e.g., Barro (1976), Besanko/Thakor (1987a), Boot
et al. (1991), Pozzolo (2002), Koziol (2007). The amount of α is common knowledge and
equal for every creditor.
10For the derivation of the risk premium, see Appendix (5.2).
11The investor speciﬁc utility functions are denoted by Ui (U
′
i > 0;U
′′
i = 0). See Appendix
(5.3) for the derivation of the future values.
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The investors' calculus of maximizing the expected utility of the future value
with respect to the amount of collateral leads to the following result:12
∂E [U (FV )]
∂C
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
(5)
Within this model framework, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1. In a world without taxation and with perfect information, risk-
neutral investors are indiﬀerent about the assumption of liability for α = 1.
Risk-neutral investors do not provide any collateral for α < 1.
Proof. The marginal utility of risk-neutral individuals is constant U
′
h = U
′
l .
Thus, the optimal condition is equal to zero for α = 1 and negative for α < 1.
Risk-neutral investors are indiﬀerent concerning the risk allocation. The param-
eter α speciﬁes the potential valuation haircut due to transaction costs on the
creditors' side. For α = 1, a change in the provided collateral has no inﬂuence
on the expected utility of the future value. Creditors and investors evaluate the
provided liability in the same way, thus, the collateral is valued symmetrically.
The advantage of lower interest payments due to the provision of collateral ex-
actly compensates the disadvantage of loosing the collateral in expectation. For
α < 1, an increase in the provided collateral decreases the expected utility of the
future value. It is not worth providing collateral for the debt if the collateral is
valued asymmetrically. The investors are better oﬀ in restricting the liability
and taking the loan unsecured. Thus, the consideration of transaction costs as
disparity in valuation of the collateral from the creditors' point of view leads to
the disappearance of the assumption of liability in this model context. Hence,
risk-neutral investors would provide collateral if and only if the provided liability
is valued symmetrically. Nevertheless, the existence of collateral is redundant
under perfect information without taxation. These well-known results are also
presented e.g. by Besanko/Thakor (1987a), p. 676, Chan/Thakor (1987) p.
350. Table 1 summarizes the investors' decision:
Table 1: Investors' optimal assumption of liability without taxation
Perfect information
α = 1 C∗ = indifferent
α < 1 C∗ = 0
12For the derivation of the result, see Appendix 5.3.
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3 Integration of taxation
From this point on, taxation is integrated in the model above. It is analysed
in the following section if the assumed design of the tax system can distort
the choice of liability. After presenting the general assumptions of the tax sys-
tem, the investors' decision under perfect information is presented and diﬀerent
tax cases concerning the taxation of collateral (here in form of a shareholders'
guarantee) are outlined. It is shown that the decision about the collateraliza-
tion depends on several parameters and solely nominal tax rates can have an
inﬂuence on the decision of liability.
3.1 General assumptions
Taxation should be considered on the level of all participating parties, including
the ﬁrm level and the shareholder level of the corporation as well as the level of
the creditors. The creditors' calculus determines the required risk premium and
is independent of the creditors' taxation if a proportional tax rate is assumed.
Hence, the creditors' taxation has no inﬂuence on the price of liability and the
decision about the collateralization. This aspect can be neglected in this analysis
and is not presented here.13 The following remarks speciﬁy the assumptions for
the taxation of the corporation on the ﬁrm level and on the level of the investors
as shareholders of the company.
All tax tarifs are assumed to be proportional. On the ﬁrm level, the corpo-
ration's income is taxed with a proportional corporate income tax rate τcit.
The shareholder level taxation is denoted by the proportional tax rate τs.
The entire tax burden of the corporation is deﬁned by the combined tax rate
τc = τcit+τs (1− τcit). A full and immediate loss oﬀset is assumed as well as the
full deductibility of interest expenses and the full taxability of default gains.14
The investment expenditure amounting to I0 = 1 is capitalized in t = 0 and
depreciated in t = 1 entirely.
Corporation - ﬁrm level
The tax base on the ﬁrm level consists of the return of the risky investment less
the full depreciation of the investment expenditure less the deductible interest
expenses in state high and plus the taxable default gain in state low.
The default gain arises in state low and is deﬁned as the non-paid part of
the debt capital, and is thus calculated as the debt capital less the cashﬂow,
13On the creditors level, the tax base consists of the interest payment in state high and the
bad-debt loss in state low. In expectation the creditors receive the risk-free interest rate that
is taxed. For further information, see Blaufus/Mantei (2014), p. 1120.
14For the analysis of loss oﬀset restrictions, see, e.g., Blaufus/Mantei (2014), p. 1123; for
eﬀects due to interest deductibility restrictions, see Blaufus et al. (2014).
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the tax payment and the invoked guarantee. For tax reasons, the amount of
guarantee can be treated diﬀerently. To consider diﬀerent kinds of tax eﬀects the
parameter, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is introduced. It speciﬁes the taxability of the amount
of the drawn guarantee for the default gain. For β = 1, the default gain is
reduced by the full amount of the invoked guarantee, for β = 0, the invoked
guarantee does not inﬂuence the outstanding liabilities and thus does not aﬀect
the taxable gain.15 The default gain results in:
DG = λ− (CFl − Tcit−l + βC) (6)
The tax payments on the ﬁrm level of the corporation result in state high:
Tcit−h = τcit (CFh − 1− λi)
= τcit (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ)) (7)
and in state low:
Tcit−l = τcit (CFl − 1 +DG)
= τcit (CFl − 1− (Dl − λ) + C (1− β)) (8)
Corporation - shareholder level
The tax base of the shareholders consists of the distribution of the corporation
less the acquisition costs of the participation. Due to the liquidation of the
corporation in t = 1, the income of the shareholders from the real investment
equals the distribution of the corporation's remaining liquidity. The distribution
is equal to the cashﬂow less the payments by the company to the creditors less
the tax payment on the ﬁrm level. The acquisition costs arise as a result of the
initially invested equity I0 (1− λ) and, generally, the amount of the liquidated
collateral C. To consider diﬀerent situations concerning the taxation of the
guarantee on the shareholder level, the parameter 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is introduced.
It deﬁnes the part of the guarantee that is taken into account as subsequent
acquisition costs.16
The tax payments on the shareholder level result in state high:
Ts−h = τs (CFh −Dh − Tcit−h − (1− λ))
= τs (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ)− Tcit−h) (9)
and in state low:
15For a detailed description of diﬀerent tax treatments and the analysis in conformity with
the German tax law, see section 3.2 and 3.3 below.
16For the more detailed analysis of the consideration of a drawn guarantee as subsequent
acquistion costs also in conformity with the German tax law, see section 3.2 and 3.3 below.
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Ts−l = τs (CFl −Dl − Tcit−l − (1− λ) + C (1− γ))
= τs (CFl − 1− (Dl − λ)− Tcit−l + C (1− γ)) (10)
Corporation - total
The entire tax payment of the corporation follows from (7) and (9) in state high:
Tc−h = τ (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ)) (11)
Using Dl = CFl− Tcit−l+C leads to (12) and shows the impact of the amount
of collateral on the tax burden in state low:17
Tc−l = τ (CFl − 1− (Dl − λ)) + τcit (1− τs)C (1− β) + τsC (1− γ)
(12)
Adjustment of the risk premium
The risk premium is not inﬂuenced by the creditors taxation, but by the tax
payment on the ﬁrm level. As in the world without taxation, in state high
the cashﬂow is high enough to cover the corporation's tax payment and the
creditors' receivables. In state low the cashﬂow does not cover the outstanding
liabilities. Assuming full and immediate loss oﬀset, the corporation receives a
tax refund Tcit−l < 0 due to the tax loss of the real investment. The tax refund
increases the corporation's liquidity and thus the payment to the creditors in
state low:
Dτs−cv =
{
Dh−cv = λI0 (1 + i) with pi
Dl−cv = CFl + αC − Tcit−l with 1− pi
(13)
The creditors' default risk and the risk premium is lower than without taxa-
tion:18
RP τ =
1− pi
pi
· λ (1 + rf )− CFl − αC + Tcit−l
λ
(14)
The investors' expected utility of the future value results in:
E [U (FV τs )] = E [U (CFs −Ds − Tc−s)] (15)
17For the derivation of the tax payments, see Appendix (5.4).
18The valuation of the collateral, parameter α, is independent of the taxation.
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with FV τh = CFh (1− τ) + τ − λ (1 + rf (1− τ)) − λRP τ (1− τ) and FV τl =
−C − Ts−l.19 To analyse the tax eﬀects concerning the assumption of liability,
the investors' decision is ﬁrst derived in a general way and subsequently with
particular consideration of the German tax law.
3.2 Analysis of tax eﬀects
The investors' optimal condition for the assumption of liability has changed
due to taxation, the decision is not independent of the tax-parameters. The
derivative of the expected utility of the future value with respect to the amount
of collateral leads to the following result:20
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)]
+U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
(16)
In comparison to equation (5), the additional terms in row two and three clarify
the tax eﬀects. In state high, the tax burden is aﬀected indirectly by the amount
of collateral. The inﬂuence of the amount of collateral on the risk premium
results in a change in deductible interest payments. The collateral decreases
the risk premium and thus lowers the tax deductible amount with the factor
α. As the tax rate increases, the incentive to provide collateral is reduced.
Furthermore, the collateral lowers the taxable default gain with the factor β
and leads to a decrease of the tax refund that results in an increases of the risk
premium and its tax deductibility in state high. This indirect tax eﬀect of the
default gain encourages the provision of collateral. In state low the shareholders'
subsequent acquisition costs increase by the amount of the collateral with factor
γ, lower the shareholders' tax base and promote the assumption of liability. The
sign of equation (16) and thus the overall eﬀect of the integration of taxation is
not obvious.
Within this model framework, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2. In a world with taxation and perfect information, the decision
of risk-neutral investors about the assumption of liability depends on the tax
rates and the amount of the parameters α, β and γ.
Proof. With U
′
h = U
′
l the optimal condition is equal to zero if α (1− τ) +
βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ = 1. Thus, the sign of the optimal condition and thereby
the advantageousness of the assumption of liability depends on the tax rates
and on the valuation parameter α as well as on the tax parameters β and γ.
19For the derivation of the future values, see Appendix (5.6).
20For the derivation, see Appendix (5.6).
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Taxation of collateral
There are an inﬁnite number of combinations of the tax rates and the parameters
α, β and γ that could lead to a positive or negative impact of provided collateral
on the expected utility.
A corporation's collateral is often provided by a shareholder's guarantee. If
creditors face bad debt, they draw on the shareholder's guarantee. Their re-
ceivables are met and the claims go beyond to the guarantors. Hence, on the
level of the corporation, it is not the sum of the liabilities that changes, but the
recipient. The corporation is no longer liable toward their creditors, but to their
shareholders.21 In case of ﬁnancial distress or insolvency (here in state low) the
shareholders (as guarantors) typically waive the recourse claims so that the li-
abilities can be derecognized on the ﬁrm level. A hidden contribution emerges
if the claims waiver results from the corporate relationship. On the shareholder
level, the hidden contribution generally leads to subsequent acquisition costs of
the participation. Thus, in state low the reduction of the default gain due to the
claims waiver is denoted by βC, the increase of the acquisition costs increase
with γC.
To analyse the eﬀects of the taxation, the possible values of the parameters β
and γ have to be clariﬁed. Thus, one must examine how the payments caused
by the guarantee inﬂuence the tax base on the ﬁrm level and on the shareholder
level. The valuation parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is independent of the consideration
of taxation. For given tax rates τcit and τs, three conceivable cases of param-
eter combinations are shortly presented hereinafter for α = 1.22 The following
equations show that taxation does not necessarily inﬂuence the assumption of
liability.
(i) β = γ = 1
In the ﬁrst case, the tax parameters are both equal to one. The amount of the
invoked guarantee equals the amount that is taken into account as subsequent
acquisition costs and as reduction of default gain. The optimal condition results
in:
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+ U
′
h (1− pi) τ (1− α)
= 0
(17)
For β = γ = 1 and α = 1, risk-neutral investors are indiﬀerent concerning the
assumption of liability. The optimal condition corresponds to equation (5) in a
21If the called guarantee only partly covers the outstanding liabilities, the liability only
partly changes the recipient. In the context of the model it would not make sense to provide
collateral that has a lower value than the outstanding liabilities.
22For further information and for α < 1, see a short explanation below and Appendix (5.6).
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world without taxation. Hence, if there is no valuation haircut of the collateral
itself and no tax speciﬁc valuation diﬀerence, the investors' decision whether or
not to provide collateral is not inﬂuenced by taxation.
(ii) β = γ < 1
In the second case, the tax parameters are equal but smaller than one. The
amount of the invoked guarantee is higher than the amount that is taken into
account for tax purposes. The optimal condition results in:
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+ U
′
h (1− pi) τ (β − α)
= −U ′ (1− pi) τ (1− β) < 0
(18)
For β = γ < 1 and α = 1, the optimal condition is negative. The tax eﬀect
of the collateral leads to the result that risk-neutral investors prefer to take
the unsecured loan. The tax disadvantage resulting from the reduction of the
tax-deductible risk premium due to increasing collateral is greater than the tax
beneﬁt caused by higher acquisition costs on the shareholder level.
(iii) β 6= γ
In the third case, β and γ diﬀer. The parameters are introduced in the model
to allow the adjustment of the tax-relevant value of the guarantee, but they can
also represent diﬀerent tax rates and assume a value greater than one.
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = U
′
(1− pi) [−τ + βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ] (19)
For β 6= γ and α = 1, the sign of the optimal condition is not unambiguous.
It depends on the value and the relation of β and γ. A positive sign of (19)
requires at least one parameter to have a value greater than one. To restrict the
analysis to realistic scenarios, the following three cases are examined according
to German tax law.
3.3 Consideration of German tax law
In Germany, the tax-relevant amount of the invoked guarantee is generally de-
termined by the fair value.23 For tax purposes, a distinction must be made
between the recoverable part of the outstanding claim and the worthless claim.
A hidden contribution is made to the extent that the receivable is valuable.
On the ﬁrm level, the hidden contribution does not trigger additional proﬁt
23See sec 6 par. 1 no. 5 German Income Tax Act.
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resulting from the claims waiver and reduces the default gain (here, denoted by
Cβ). The worthless part of the receivable leads to a taxable proﬁt as part of
the default gain (C (1− β)). On the shareholder level, in accordance with the
correspondence principle of the German Tax Law,24 the recoverable part of the
claim determines the amount of the subsequent acquisition costs (here, denoted
by Cγ). The worthless part counts as taxable private capital loss (C (1− γ)).
This leads to the conclusion that, in general, the impairment of the receivable
is crucial for the amount of the parameters β and γ, and thus, the taxable
consideration as subsequent acquisition costs and the corresponding reduction
of the outstanding liabilities.
(i) β = γ = 1
In the ﬁrst case, the amount of the invoked guarantee equals the amount that
counts as the hidden contribution and subsequent acquisition costs. In accor-
dance with established German case law, this case can occur if the guarantee is
assumed due to the corporate relationship.25 For example, this includes guar-
antees that are intended for crisis situations or are even granted during hard
times. Thus, independent of the fair value of the receivable (and thus the hidden
contribution), the entire amount of the invoked guarantee is taken into account,
both on the ﬁrm level as reduction of the default gain and on the shareholder
level as subsequent acquisition costs.26
(ii) β = γ < 1
The second case, represents a situation in which the fair value of the receivable
is lower than the nominal value and determinant for tax purposes. The reference
date for the fair value is the point of time when the guarantee results from the
corporate relationship.27 If the guarantor retains his guarantee agreement in
times of crisis, this is caused by the corporate relationship and hence, according
to sec 6 par. 1 no. 5 German Income Tax Act, the fair value of the hidden
contribution is determinant for the tax-related eﬀects. Due to the intendend
principle of correspondence in the German tax law,28 the parameters β and γ
generally have the same value.
24See sec. 8 par. 3 Corporation Tax Code.
25See Federal Court of Finance judgements, e.g., of 2nd October 1984, 9th September 1986,
24th April 1997, 4th March 2008.
26See Federal Court of Finance judgements, e.g., of 26th January 1999, 20th April 2004.
27See e.g., Federal Court of Finance judgement of 6th July 1999.
28See sec. 8 par. 3 Corporation Tax Code.
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(iii') β = 1 < γ
In the third case, the parameters β and γ diﬀer. This can occur for example if
diﬀerent tax rates are relevant.
Under German tax law, natural persons, as shareholders of a corporation, gen-
erally have to tax 60 % of their positive income from their participation at their
personal income tax rate τs = 0, 6 · τpit. Hence, 40% of the participation income
is tax-exempt.29 Accordingly, a prohibition of partial deduction applies for neg-
ative income that is related to the participation.30 Thus, the same tax rate
applies (τs) and only 60% of expenses or losses are tax-deductible. The Federal
Court of Finance decided that the partial prohibition of deduction for expenses
under section 3c German Income Tax Code does not apply if the taxpayer did
not receive any revenue through the participation.31 This also holds true for the
issue at hand.32 Hence, the subsequent acquisition costs are tax-deductible with
a higher tax rate τpit > τs and therefore γ > 1. This leads to an encouragement
of the provision of collateral. For case (iii'), it holds α = 1, β = 1 and γ > 1
and the optimal condition results in:
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) (−τα+ βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ)
= U
′
h (1− pi) τs (γ − 1) > 0
(20)
The optimal condition is positive.33 With increasing collateral, the tax disad-
vantage due to the reduction of the tax-deductible risk premium is smaller than
the tax beneﬁt because of the lower tax payment caused by higher acquisition
costs. The additional tax advantage on the shareholder level resulting from
the tax deductibility with a factor γ > 1 leads to a positive eﬀect of provided
collateral on the expected utility of the future value for risk-neutral investors.
Overall, it can be noticed that the tax parameters can change the collateral's
advantageousness. Taxation can either encourage or hamper the assumption of
liability. As explained above, for α < 1 the provision of collateral becomes more
unattractive, but the direction of the tax eﬀects remain unchanged. In case (i),
the taxation does not cause an additional eﬀect, the provision of collateral is
not optimal for α < 1. In case (ii), the negative tax eﬀect ampliﬁes the negative
eﬀect of the asymmetric valuation so that collateral is optimally not provided.
In case (iii'), the positive tax eﬀect can overcompensate the negative valuation
eﬀect but the result is not unambiguous. The results are shortly presented in
table 2:
29See sec. 3 no. 40 German Income Tax Code.
30See sec. 3c German Income Tax Code.
31See e.g., Federal Court of Finance, judgements of 14th July 2009; 6th April 2011.
32See Finance Court Düsseldorf, judgement of 20th November 2012, Federal Court of Fi-
nance, judgment of 20th August 2013.
33For other combinations of β and γ with one parameter greater than one and one parameter
less than one, the sign of the equation (20) is not unambiguous (see above case (iii)).
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Table 2: Investors' optimal assumption of liability with taxation under
perfect information
case (i) case (ii) case (iii')
β = γ = 1 β = γ < 1 β = 1 < γ
α = 1 C∗ = indifferent C∗ = 0 C∗ = Cmax
α < 1 C∗ = 0 C∗ = 0 ambiguous
4 Conclusion and discussion
Building on the articles by Blaufus/Mantei (2014) and Blaufus et al. (2014),
this paper concerns the question of tax eﬀects on the provision of collateral.
Empirical studies show that the majority of loans are secured and even personal
commitments are often required.34 But, previous research neglects possible
eﬀects of a diﬀerentiated tax system on the provision of collateral. In this essay,
it is shown that a general conclusion about the impact of taxation cannot be
made.
The comparison of the results of the investors' decision in a world with and
without taxation shows that taxes do not necessarily inﬂuence the investors'
behavior. It always depends on the individual case and on the design of the
relevant tax system.
Resuming the well-known results in a world without taxation, the existence
of collateral is redundant under perfect information.35 Without considering
any transaction costs, risk-neutral investors are indiﬀerent to the assumption
of liability. Taking a disparity in collateral valuation to the detriment of the
investors into account, risk-neutral investors optimally refuse to provide any
guarantee for risky debt capital. The securitization of loans can only be justiﬁed
when taxation is considered.
Taxation can encourage or hamper the assumption of liability. The decision
about the provision of a guarantee can change depending on tax-relevant val-
uation principles and tax rates. The tax cases explained above illustrate the
impact of relevant tax parameters. In contrast to former results, it is shown
that taxation can justify the existence of collateral even under perfect infor-
mation. A positive tax eﬀect (see case (iii')) can encourage the assumption of
liability so that risk-neutral investors are no longer indiﬀerent to the provision of
guarantees. The tax beneﬁt can principally even overcompensate a disadvantage
due to a disparity in valuation.
Thus, taxation can set an incentive to provide collateral. The direction of the
34See e.g., Davydenko/Franks (2008), Steijvers et al. (2010), Blazy/Weill (2013).
35See e.g., Besanko/Thakor (1987a), Becker/Fuest (2007).
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tax eﬀects depends on several tax parameters, but is independent of a disparity
in collateral valuation.
Additional research could integrate information asymmetry into this model and
analyse eventual upcoming interdependencies between the collateral's taxation
and private information on the provision of guarantees. Private information
could be associated with the investors' risk, e.g. expressed by the individual
success probability. Furthermore, taxable loss oﬀset restrictions or costs for
pledging collateral from the investors' point of view could possibly lead to ad-
ditional tax eﬀects in the model. Regarding diﬀerent legal forms, the liability
limitations are important but could theoretically be expressed by the provision
of collateral as well. For further research it could also be interesting to clarify
how the legislative framework and the design of diﬀerent forms of liability could
inﬂuence the assumption of liability.
5 Appendix
5.1 Maximal collateral
The eﬀective amount of collateral is maximized if the creditors do not face any
default risk and do not require a risk premium. Therefore, the payments to
the creditors, also in state low, have to equal the debt capital plus the risk-free
interest payment.
Dl−cv = λ (1 + rf )
⇔ CFl + αC = λ (1 + rf )
⇔ Cmax = 1α (λ (1 + rf )− CFl)
(21)
In a world with taxation, the tax refund in state low is payed to the creditors (see
equation (14)). The tax refund is transfered as cash to the creditors and thus,
cannot be valued asymmetrically. Independent of symmetric or asymmetric
valuation of the collateral, the maximal amount of eﬀective collateral is lower
(Cmaxτ < C
max):
Dτl−cv = λ (1 + rf )
⇔ CFl + αC − Tcit−l = λ (1 + rf )
⇔ Cmaxτ = 1α (λ (1 + rf )− CFl + Tcit−l)
(22)
5.2 Risk premium without taxation
Using the creditors' calculus (equation (2)), the risk premium (RP = i − rf )
results in:
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λ (1 + rf ) = E [Ds−cv]
⇔ λ (1 + rf ) = piλ (1 + i) + (1− pi) (CFl + αC)
⇔ λ (1 + rf ) = piλ (1 + rf ) + piλRP
+(1− pi) (CFl + αC)
⇔ (1− p) [λ (1 + rf )− CFl − αC] = piλRP
⇔ RP = 1−pipi ·
λ(1+rf )−Dl−cv
λ
5.3 Investors' decision without taxation
Using RP = 1−pipi ·
λ(1+rf )−CFl−αC
λ , the future values in a world without taxation
result in:
FVh = CFh −Dh = CFh − λ (1 + i)
= CFh − λ (1 + rf )− λ 1−pipi ·
λ(1+rf )−CFl−αC
λ
and
FVl = CFl −Dl = CFl − (CFl + C)
= −C
The derivative of the expected utility of the future values with respect to the
collateral results in:
∂E[U(FV )]
∂C = piU
′
h
(
α 1−pipi
)
+ (1− pi)U ′l (−1)
= (1− pi)αU ′h − (1− pi)Ul
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
) (23)
For α = 1 (α < 1), the investors are indiﬀerent about the provision of collateral
(do not provide collateral).
5.4 Tax payments
The tax payments result as follows.
Corporation - ﬁrm level:
Tcit−h = τcit (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ))
= τcit (CFh − 1− λi)
= τcit (CFh − 1− λrf − λRP )
= τcit
(
CFh − 1− λrf − 1−pipi (λI0 (1 + rf )−Dl−cv)
) (24)
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and
Tcit−l = τcit (CFl − 1− (Dl − λ) + (1− β)C)
= τcit (CFl − 1− (CFl − Tcit−l + C − λ) + (1− β)C)
= τcit (CFl − 1 +DG)
= τcit (CFl − 1− (CFl − Tcit−l + βC − λ))
= − τcit1−τcit (1− λ+ βC)
(25)
Corporation - shareholder level:
Ts−h = τs (CFh −Dh − Tcit−h − (1− λ))
= τs (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ)− τcit (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ)))
= τs (1− τcit) (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ))
= τs (1− τcit)
(
CFh − 1− λrf − 1−pipi (λI0 (1 + rf )−Dl−cv)
) (26)
In state low, the payment to the creditors is partly done by the corporation
itself and partly (in the amount of the called collateral) by the shareholders. In
equation (27), Dl = CFl−Tcit−l+C has to be adjusted for the tax base by the
amount of the collateral. By using (8) the tax payment results in:
Ts−l = τs (CFl −Dl + C − Tcit−l − (1− λ+ γC))
= τs (CFl −Dl − Tcit−l − (1− λ) + C (1− γ))
= τs (CFl − (CFl − Tcit−l + C) + C − Tcit−l − (1− λ+ γC))
= −τs (1− λ+ γC)
= −τs (1− λ)− τsγC
(27)
Corporation - total:
Tc−h = Tcit−h + Ts−h = τ (CFh − 1− (Dh − λ)) (28)
Using Dl = CFl − Tcit−l + C leads to
Tc−l = Tcit−l + Ts−l
= τ (CFl − 1− (Dl − λ)) + τcit (1− τs)C (1− β) + τsC (1− γ)
= τ (CFl − 1− (CFl − Tcit−l + C − λ))
+τcit (1− τs) (1− β)C + τs (1− γ)C
= τ (CFl − 1− (CFl − Tcit−l − λ)) + βCτcit (1− τs) + γCτs
= − τ1−τcit (1− λ)− C
βτcit+γτs(1−τcit)
1−τcit
(29)
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5.5 Risk premium with taxation
In state low the tax refund on the ﬁrm level is additionally payed to the creditors.
The risk premium is lower than in a world without taxation for every Tcit−l < 0.
RP τ = 1−pipi ·
λ(1+rf )−Dl
λ
= 1−pipi ·
λ(1+rf )−CFl−αC+Tcit−l
λ
= 1−pipi ·
λ(1+rf )−CFl−αC− τcit1−τcit (1−λ+βC)
λ
(30)
5.6 Investors' decision with taxation
Using RP τ = 1−pipi ·
λ(1+rf )−CFl−αC+Tcit−l
λ the future values in a world with
taxation result in:
FV τh = CFh −Dh − Tc−h
= CFh (1− τ) + τ − λ (1 + rf (1− τ))−
− (1− τ) 1−pipi
[
λ (1 + rf )− CFl − αC − τcit1−τcit (1− λ+ βC)
]
and
FV τl = CFl −Dl − Tc−l
= CFl − (CFl + C − Tcit−l)− Tcit−l − Ts−l
= −C − Ts−l
= −C + τs (1− λ) + τsγC
The derivative of the expected utility of the future value with respect to the
collateral results in:
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = piU
′
h
(
α 1−pipi − τα
1−pi
pi
+ τcit(1−τ)1−τcit β
)
+(1− pi) (−1 + τsγ)
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)]
+U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
(31)
The decision on the provision of collateral depends on the tax parameters.
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Tax cases without valuation haircut α = 1
(i) β = γ = 1
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= 0
C∗ = indifferent
(ii) β = γ < 1
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= U
′
h (1− pi) (−τ + βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ)
= −U ′h (1− pi) τ (1− β) < 0
C∗ = 0
(iii) β 6= γ
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= U
′
(1− pi) [−τ + βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ]
C∗ = ambiguous
(iii') β = 1 < γ
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= U
′
h (1− pi) [−τ + τcit (1− τs) + τs − τs + τsγ]
= U
′
h (1− pi) (−τ + τcit (1− τs) + τsγ − τs (γ − 1) + (γ − 1))
= U
′
h (1− pi) τs (γ − 1) > 0
C∗ = Cmaxτ
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Tax cases with valuation haircut α < 1
(i) β = γ = 1
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+ U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ τcit (1− τs) + τs]
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+ U
′
h (1− pi) τ (1− α)
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) + U
′
h (1− pi) τ (1− α)
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) (1− τ) < 0
C∗ = 0
(ii) β = γ < 1
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+ U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ]
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+ U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ τ − τ + βτ ]
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) + U
′
h (1− pi) τ (1− α)− U
′
h (1− pi) τ (1− β)
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) (1− τ)− U
′
h (1− pi) τ (1− β) < 0
C∗ = 0
(iii) β 6= γ
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ − τ + τ ]
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+ U
′
h (1− pi) (−τα+ τ)
+U
′
h (1− pi) (−τ + βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ)
+U
′
h (1− pi) (−τ + βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ)
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) (1− τ)
+U
′
h (1− pi) (−τ + βτcit (1− τs) + τsγ) ≷ 0
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(iii') β = 1 < γ
∂E[U(FV τ )]
∂C = (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ βτcit (1− τs)] + U
′
l (1− pi) τsγ
= (1− pi)
(
αU
′
h − U
′
l
)
+U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ τcit (1− τs) + τsγ − τs (γ − 1) + τs (γ − 1)]
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) + U
′
h (1− pi) [−τα+ τ + τs (γ − 1)]
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) + U
′
h (1− pi) τ (1− α) + U
′
h (1− pi) τs (γ − 1)
= −U ′h (1− pi) (1− α) (1− τ) + U
′
h (1− pi) τs (γ − 1) ≷ 0
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